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whose reliability is well-established and a new component that has an unknown 
reliability. This paper compares the statistical approaches for updating 
reliability assessments based on additional simulation or experimental data. We 
consider four statistical approaches for modelling the uncertainty about a new 
component’s failure probability: a classical approach, a precise Bayesian 
approach, a robust Bayesian approach and an imprecise probability approach. 
We show that an imprecise beta model is compatible with both the robust 
Bayesian approach and the imprecise probability approach. The different 
approaches for forming and updating the designer’s beliefs about the product 
reliability are illustrated and compared under different scenarios of available 
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1 Introduction 
Engineers make decisions based on their beliefs. These beliefs depend upon the 
information that the engineer has gathered, and they can change based on new 
information (e.g., from additional experts, experiments and simulations). Statistical 
reasoning includes a variety of approaches for updating beliefs based on new 
information. This type of reasoning is especially important when considering the 
reliability of a product because product failures are inherently random. 
This paper considers different statistical approaches for updating beliefs about the 
reliability of a product and discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach. We consider a specific reliability estimation problem under a number of 
different scenarios of available information. 
From a practical perspective, it can be argued that the following properties are 
desirable for a procedure of testing and analysing reliability (or more generally 
probability) data. First, it can be valuable to incorporate existing information that may be 
relevant into the analysis; otherwise, existing information is essentially wasted. Second, 
the procedure should allow for new information to be incorporated into the estimate. 
Third, for experimental design and planning, the procedure should help the engineers to 
determine if they need more information and if so, how much. 
In Aughenbaugh and Herrmann (2007), the authors showed how each statistical 
approach could be applied in different information scenarios in order to help engineers 
understand each approach and consider the tradeoffs between them. The current paper 
reviews some of those results but discusses and compares the approaches differently and 
more completely. 
This paper begins by stating the problem and introducing three scenarios that 
correspond to situations in which the designer initially has no information, has substantial 
information and has partial information. After briefly describing the statistical approaches 
that will be considered, the paper then discusses their performance in the no information 
scenario. Then, the paper considers the impact of the information scenario on the 
reliability estimates that each approach produces. Finally, the paper compares the 
approaches. 
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2 Reliability  assessment 
The performance of a product is unpredictable and often involves random behaviour. 
Multiple items (i.e., instances of the product being designed) will be manufactured, sold 
and used. Ideally, these items are identical. In practice, however, differences exist due to 
variations in materials and the manufacturing processes used to create them. Moreover, 
different items are used in different environments and in different ways. 
The possibility of failures, though disagreeable to the designer, is unavoidable for the 
above reasons. Some items will fail, while others will not fail. Here, ‘failure’ is taken 
very generally, but we assume it is a one-time event in the lifetime of an item. In practice, 
the failure could be that the item’s performance did not meet certain requirements during 
a test or that it catastrophically stops working at some point during its lifetime. We 
assume that each item’s failure is a random Bernoulli process. 
2.1 Problem  statement 
We consider the case where a designer must compare a new component that has an 
unknown reliability to an existing component whose reliability is well-established. A 
design team wishes to reduce the cost of a product by replacing one particularly 
expensive component of the system with a new, lower cost component. Cost is a typical 
motivation, but other issues could motivate the replacement. However, the new 
component must be at least as reliable as the existing component. 
It will be convenient to frame things in terms of failure rates instead of reliability. The 
failure rate of the existing component is  crit θ . Let θ  be the failure probability of the new 
component, which is the parameter of interest. In order to select the new component (as a 
replacement of the existing one), the designer requires that  . crit θ θ ≤  Ideally, the designer 
would have enough data to make a precise assessment of  , θ  s u c h  a s  ‘ 0.01 θ = ’. 
However, as discussed later in this paper, there are practical reasons why the designer 
cannot or is unwilling to make a precise assessment despite holding some initial beliefs 
about  . θ  
We assume that the designer has the opportunity to obtain additional data from testing 
in order to update his beliefs. The designer can perform n tests in which the performance 
of the new component – success or failure – is observed. We assume that test 
performance is the actual performance of interest or is an acceptable surrogate for actual 
performance. Let m be the number of failures observed (and consequently nm  
successes are observed). For convenience, we define a variable 
−
1 i x =  if trial i is a failure 
and   otherwise. Then  0 i x =
1 .
n
i i m
= = x ∑  We assume each test is an independent 
Bernoulli trial, so   is a binomial random variable.  m
Throughout this paper we will use an example to demonstrate the approaches. In this 
example, the existing component’s failure probability is  0.05, crit θ =  and the new 
component’s true failure probability is  0.04, θ =  which is unknown to the designer. This 
paper compares the use of different statistical approaches for updating the designer’s 
beliefs about the failure probability θ  given any prior information and the set of results 
  1 {}. n
i i Xx = =
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2.2.  Information scenario descriptions 
The feasibility and desirability of a given approach for updating one’s beliefs about an 
uncertain quantity depend upon the initial conditions, including the amount of data 
currently available and the beliefs that are currently held. In this paper, three scenarios 
are considered: 
1  No relevant prior information is available. 
2  Substantial, highly relevant data histories are available. 
3  Partially relevant information or a small amount of relevant information is available. 
The placement of an analysis task into one of these categories is a subjective judgement 
of the designer and his assessment certainly could be incorrect; in this case, it may be 
valuable for subsequent testing and analysis to indicate this error. 
After describing the scenarios, we will briefly discuss the use of each statistical 
approach in each scenario. 
2.2.1  Scenario 1: no prior information 
In this scenario, the designer has concluded that there is no available information that is 
relevant to the desired reliability analysis. For example, the new component may be so 
novel or the environment so different that the designer believes that existing data have 
little value in predicting the performance of the new component. Essentially, the designer 
needs to construct an estimate of the reliability from scratch. All inferences about the 
component’s reliability will be made using only the data samples received from the 
planned experiments, specifically  1 {} . n
i i Xx = =  
2.2.2  Scenario 2: substantial prior information 
In this scenario, there exists substantial information that the designer believes is relevant 
to the desired reliability analysis. The designer is considering testing as a way of 
verifying this information. For example, the new component may be a minor 
modification of the existing component. Alternatively, the new component may have 
been used in other similar settings, so its past performance is a good indication of its 
performance in this new setting. 
2.2.3  Scenario 3: partial prior information 
In this scenario, there exists some information that the designer believes is relevant to the 
desired reliability analysis, but the designer is considering testing in order to augment this 
partial information. For example, perhaps the existing data came from another setting that 
did not stress the component as it will be stressed in the future, or perhaps the data came 
from tests on an existing component with a similar, but not equivalent design. Additional 
experiments can be used to verify that the actual performance characteristics are similar 
and to refine the estimates. 
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3  Statistical approaches for updating reliability estimates 
This paper compares four approaches for analysing data and updating beliefs about the 
parameter θ  in the scenarios of information described in the preceding: 
1  classical sampling theory 
2 precise  Bayesian 
3 robust  Bayesian 
4  imprecise probability theory. 
The following subsections briefly describe the use of these approaches for the reliability 
assessment problem. The relationship between the robust Bayesian approach and 
imprecise probability theory is also discussed. 
3.1  Classical sampling theory approach 
Classical sampling theory approaches to statistical analyses are generally emphasised in 
introductory texts such as Hogg and Tanis (2001). Standard in these approaches is the 
adoption of a frequentist interpretation of probabilities. 
The classical sampling theory approach focuses on the observed data   An 
unbiased point estimate of 
1 {}. n
i i x =
θ  is the relative frequency of failures to trials in the sample. 
Specifically, one can estimate θ  as 
1
ˆ //
n
i i x nm n θ
= == ∑ . Let  zα  be the 100(1 ) α −  
percentile of the standard normal distribution. Then, a commonly used approximate   
one-sided 100(1 )% α −  confidence interval gives an upper bound on θ  (Hogg and Tanis, 
2001): 
1
0, 1
mm m
z
nn n
α
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ +− ⎢ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ n
⎥  (1) 
We use the upper bound for this problem because the designer would like the failure 
probability to be below the threshold. If this interval includes  , crit θ  then one cannot 
reliably conclude that  crit θ θ ≤  based on the test results. We note that other confidence 
intervals for estimating this parameter have been proposed. For a full discussion of them, 
see Brown et al. (2001). 
Equation (1) is an approximation because the actual coverage probability varies with 
 and n . A general rule of thumb is to only use this approximation for values such that 
both   and   We will explore values on both sides of these limits for 
completeness. For small sample size, one may consider using the t-statistic instead of a 
normal, although generally when the size is small enough to justify this, the rule of thumb 
is not met anyway. 
m
5 m ≥ 5. nm −≥
The classical approach is well suited to Scenario 1, in which no prior information 
exists, because it analyses only the observed data, that is,  1 {} . n
i i Xx = =  Because the prior 
information plays no role in the analysis, the classical approach remains the same in 
Scenarios 2 and 3. 
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3.2  Precise Bayesian approach 
The Bayesian approach (e.g., Berger, 1985) provides a way to combine existing 
knowledge and new knowledge into a single estimate by using Bayes’s theorem. 
Bayes’s theorem is a direct extension of the rules of conditional probability, so its 
validity is generally accepted (Box and Tiao, 1973). Some people use the term ‘Bayesian’ 
to describe anything that uses Bayes’s theorem and this will be the usage in this paper. 
Others use the term to refer to any procedure that uses a subjective interpretation of 
probabilities (more precisely known as subjective Bayesianism or subjectivism). Under a 
subjective interpretation, a probability is an expression of belief based on an individual’s 
willingness to bet (Savage, 1972; de Finetti, 1974; Lindley, 1982). Bayes’s theorem 
provides an objective way to update any initial probability with objective data. If the 
prior is a subjective prior, then the posterior is necessarily subjective as well. However, 
one can also use ‘objective Bayesian analyses’ in which the prior distributions are 
defined without subjective input. In these cases, the analysis can be viewed as entirely 
objective. See Berger (2000) for further discussion and references. 
One of the requirements of Bayesian analysis is a prior distribution that will be 
updated. Many of the strongest arguments both for and against Bayesian analysis 
(compared to the classical approach) involve the prior. On the one hand, if a designer has 
existing information about  , θ  it is important to consider this information in the new 
estimate of  . θ  On the other hand, if the designer has no specific information about  , θ  t  
introduction of a particular prior may distort the posterior estimate. 
he
The objective selection of a prior distribution in the absence of relevant prior 
information is a topic of extensive research and debate. The approaches proposed include 
the use of ‘non-informative priors’ (Jeffreys, 1961; Zellner, 1977; Berger and Bernardo, 
1992), maximum-entropy priors (Fougere, 1990) and data-dependent empirical Bayes 
approaches (Maritz and Lewin, 1989). Still, whether a single prior distribution can reflect 
all of the uncertainty is an open question to some observers. 
In general, determining this posterior distribution can be computationally 
burdensome, as the output is a distribution over all possible values of  . θ  To support 
analytical solutions, the form of the prior is often restricted to ‘conjugate’ distributions 
with respect to the measurement model, in which case the posterior distribution that 
results from the update has the same type as the prior. When using non-conjugate   
priors, one can employ existing codes for computing the posterior. See, for   
instance, the Bayesian inference using Gibbs sampling (BUGS) project at 
http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs/. 
For the problem considered in this paper, in which the number of failures in a given 
number of tests is a binomial random variable, it is convenient to model the prior as a 
beta distribution with parameters α  and  , β  written  (,) Beta αβ and having density 
shown in equation (2) where  (, B ) αβ is the beta function. 
1 1
(;, ) ( 1 )
(,)
f
B
1 α β θαβ θ θ
αβ
− = − −  (2) 
Using this prior and a binomial likelihood function, the posterior will also be a beta 
distribution. Specifically, when one starts with the prior distribution  00 (,) Beta αβ and 
observes  failures out of   trials, the posterior distribution is  m n 00 (, m n ) . Beta m αβ + +−  
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Consequently, the update can be done analytically by simple addition and subtraction, an 
enormous improvement in efficiency over the general case. 
For our reliability assessment example, we use the priors shown in Table 1. The 
selections are made somewhat arbitrarily, but we have explicitly considered different 
priors for each scenario in order to demonstrate how prior selection can affect the results. 
In Scenario 1, with no prior information, a natural and common choice is the uniform  
[0, 1] distribution, a special case of the beta distribution  00 (1  a n d   1 ) . αβ = = The 
applicability of this choice will be revealed in the subsequent analysis. 
In Scenario 2, we consider priors that represent the substantial, relevant information. 
It will be convenient to use a beta distribution. Larger values of  0 α  and  0 β  yield a prior 
distribution with less variance. We use both ‘good’ priors that are good estimates of the 
true failure probability and ‘bad’ priors that are not. 
In Scenario 3, for the beta distribution, it is natural to choose the parameters  0 α  and 
0 β  such that the mean  ( 000 / ) α αβ +  is close to where the designer believes that the true 
value of θ  may be. We use small absolute values to reflect the inadequate amount of 
information. Choosing  0 1 α ≥  ensures that the density function has a bell-shaped curve. 
Lindley and Phillips (1976) discuss this process and give some relevant examples. Again, 
we use both ‘good’ priors that are good estimates of the true failure probability and ‘bad’ 
priors that are not. 
Because the problem considered here is an estimation problem (the designer wants to 
know the true value of the failure probability and to compare this to the critical value), 
one can consider point estimates of the parameter that are based on the posterior 
distribution. These estimates include the mean and median of the posterior and the 
maximum likelihood estimate, i.e., the value of θ  that maximises the density 
(| ) . Yy π θ =  
Alternatively, one can express probabilities about the parameter. The probability that 
crit θ θ ≤  is given in equation (3). 
0
[] ( | )
crit
crit P
θ
y d θ θπ θ ≤= ⋅ ∫ θ  (3) 
If this probability is large enough, the designer can be comfortable that the failure 
probability is acceptably small. 
Another alternative is to use intervals to estimate the parameter. Using the posterior, a 
‘credible interval’ (or more generally, a ‘credible set’) can be found such that the 
probability that the true value is an element of the set is equal to a desired value. It is 
natural to calculate the 100(1 ) α −  percentile of the posterior distribution, denoted  1 α θ −  
and form the 100(1 )% α −  credible set   The decision criteria then 
becomes determining whether this interval contains 
(1 ) {| 0 } . α θθ θ − ≤≤
. crit θ  If it does, then the probability 
that  crit θ θ ≤  is less than 100(1 )% α −  and the new component is unacceptable at that 
level. 
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3.3  Robust Bayesian approach 
The robust Bayesian approach, sometimes called Bayesian sensitivity analysis, addresses 
the problem of lack of confidence in the prior (Berger, 1984, 1985, 1993; Insua and 
Ruggeri, 2000). The core idea of the approach is to perform a ‘what-if’ analysis by 
changing the prior. The analyst considers several reasonable prior distributions. After 
additional data is collected, each candidate prior is updated, resulting in a set of posterior 
distributions. This set of posterior distributions yields a range of point estimates and a set 
of credible intervals. If there is no significant change in the conclusion across this set of 
posteriors, then the conclusion is ‘robust’ to the selection of the prior. 
This analysis is not possible with a single prior. Even when using a prior with an 
inflated variance (a common attempt to capture lack of information in the precise 
Bayesian approach), the analyst is still only considering one scenario. In some cases, this 
proxy may work adequately, but it does not provide as rigorous an exploration of the 
problem as the robust Bayesian approach. This difference is discussed further in   
Section 6.3. 
3.4  Imprecise probabilities approach 
The theory of imprecise probabilities, formalised by Walley (1991), has previously been 
considered in risk-based engineering design decisions (Aughenbaugh and Paredis, 2006) 
and related methods have been considered in reliability (Coolen, 1994; Utkin, 2004a, 
2004b). However, a direct comparison to other methods has not been made in the context 
of updating reliability estimates. 
The theory of imprecise probabilities uses the same fundamental notion of rationality 
as de Finetti’s work (1974). However, the theory allows a range of indeterminacy – prices 
at which a decision-maker will not enter a gamble as either a buyer or a seller. These in 
turn correspond to ranges of probabilities. For the problem of updating beliefs, imprecise 
probability theory essentially allows for prior and posterior beliefs to be expressed as sets 
of density functions, compared to the precise Bayesian requirement that exactly one 
distribution should capture an individual’s beliefs. 
As explained previously, the beta distribution represents a convenient prior for the 
example problem in this paper under the precise Bayesian approach. For the robust 
updating approach, it is convenient to use the imprecise beta model, described by Walley 
(1991) and Walley et al. (1996) and to re-parameterise the beta so that the density of θ  is 
as given in equation (4). 
1( 1
, () ( 1 ) ) 1 sts
st
t π θθ θ −− ∝−−  (4) 
Compared to the standard parameterisation of  (,) , Beta αβ  this means that  s t α =⋅ and 
(1 ) s t β =⋅−  or equivalently that s α β = +  and  /( t ). α α β = +  The convenience of this 
parameterisation is that   is the mean of the distribution, which has an easily grasped 
meaning for both the prior assessment and the posterior analysis. The model is updated as 
follows: if the prior parameters are 
t
0 s  and   then the posterior parameters after   trials 
with   failures are given by 
0 t
0
, n
m n s sn = +  and  00 () n ts t 0 / m ( s n ) . = ++  Since  0 n , s sn =+ 
0 s  can be interpreted to be a virtual sample size of the prior information; it captures how 
much weight to place on the prior compared to the observed data. Selecting this 
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parameter therefore depends on the available information and will be discussed with the 
different information scenarios. 
Following Walley (1991), the parameters can be imprecise. That is, the priors are the 
set of beta distributions with  00 0 s t α =  and  ( ) 00 0 1 s t β =−  such that  00 0 ttt ≤≤ and 
00 0 . s ss ≤≤ After the test results are observed, each prior in the set is updated as 
described above. 
The use of the imprecise beta model obviously affects the decision process in several 
ways, but most revealing is how it affects point estimation. Using a precise prior input, 
one gets a precise posterior output and a single point estimate. In the imprecise model, 
there are multiple posterior distributions and consequently a range of point estimates. In 
particular, the interval [,] n n tt is an interval estimate of  , θ  where the endpoints are 
calculated as follows: 
0 00
00 0 {( )/( )} min n sss
ts t m s
≤≤
=+ n +  (5) 
{
0 00
00 0 () / ( max n
sss
ts t m s
≤≤
=+ } ) n +  (6) 
One approach for deciding whether or not  crit θ θ ≤  is to compare this interval to  . crit θ  If 
, nc r i t t θ ≤  then the designer knows that a decision that  crit θ θ ≤  is robust across the range 
of prior assumptions when using the mean estimate of θ  as the decision criterion. 
However, as with the precise case, a designer may wish to calculate the probability that 
crit θ θ ≤  and compare this with some critical value. One can find upper and lower 
probabilities for this based on the set of posterior distributions. Although this varies 
across the set of posterior distributions, the minimal and maximal values occur using the 
posterior distributions that correspond to the priors at the extreme points of 
0 00 [,][,] . tt ss × 0  Finally, one can determine a set of credible intervals from these 
posterior distributions. 
3.5  Connection between robust Bayesian and imprecise probability approaches 
Although the motivations differ between the robust Bayesian approach and the imprecise 
beta model, the computational approaches both involve the application of Bayes’s 
theorem to a set of priors, thus resulting in a set of posterior distributions. For example, 
consider a statistical description of experiments on a similar component as the baseline, 
which is well modelled by the beta prior  0 10 α =  and  0 90. β =  However, the engineers 
believe that the new component actually could have a smaller mean failure rate, and thus 
the baseline distribution could be shifted to the left to form the prior, yielding  0 5 α =  and 
0 95. β =  Conversely, there may also be a reason to believe that the new design has a 
higher failure rate, and thus it would be prudent to shift the distribution to the right to 
form the prior, yielding  0 15 α =  and  0 85. β =  Figure 1 shows these three probability 
distribution functions. The extreme distributions form the boundaries of a box of 
distribution functions, which is called a p-box (Ferson et al., 2002). 
This representation is consistent with both a set of prior distributions and a statement 
of imprecise probabilities, although the formulation of the priors may differ (Pericchi and 
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Walley, 1991). All of the beta distributions bounded by this p-box could be considered 
priors for robust Bayesian analysis. Using the parameters  0 s  and   instead of  0 t 0 α  and 
0, β  we see that   for all of these distributions, but   ranges from 0.05 to 0.15. 
Thus, this set of distributions is also consistent with an imprecise beta model describing 
imprecise probabilities. Consequently, in this reliability assessment problem, it is 
consistent to use the imprecise beta model to represent both imprecise probability 
distributions and a robust Bayesian set of prior distributions and to apply Bayes’s 
theorem to update the model to determine the set of posterior distributions. However, not 
all methods for imprecise probabilities are compatible with robust Bayesian techniques. 
0 100 s = 0 t
Figure 1  P-box of different beta distributions (see online version for colours) 
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3.6  Prior selection for the imprecise beta model 
In Scenario 1, when there is a complete lack of prior information, the appropriate starting 
point is a ‘vacuous prior’ (so-called because it contains the least information). In the 
imprecise beta model, this means setting  0 0 t =  and  0 1, t =  all that is said is that the 
probability is somewhere between 0 and 1, which is the least specific statement that is 
possible. We must also choose a ‘learning parameter’  0. s  Because it reflects how much 
‘importance’ to assign to the prior data and there is no prior data, one should select a 
small learning parameter. However, if it is too small, the posterior may react too quickly 
to the data. As described by Walley (1991),  0 2 s =  has a number of good properties, but 
one can also allow for a range, such as  0 0 s =  and  0 2 s = , that contains several of the 
different precise Bayesian priors proposed in the literature. 
Note that   and   corresponds to the beta distribution with  0 0.5 t = 0 2 s = 0 1 α =  and 
0 1. β =  Thus, this vacuous set of priors includes the single uniform prior considered in 
the precise Bayesian approach with no information. This highlights the difference 
between a uniform (precise) prior and a vacuous prior. A vacuous prior is a set of prior 
distributions that happens to contain the uniform prior; therefore, the vacuous prior is 
more general than the uniform prior. 
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In Scenario 2, given substantial prior information, the designer can choose  0 t  and  0 t  
to be upper and lower bounds on  . θ  If the designer is unsure of how much ‘importance’ 
to assign to the prior data, then the designer could specify upper and lower learning 
parameters  0 s  and  0. s  In the case of substantial information, we would expect  0 t  and  0 t  
to be close to each other and  0 s  and  0 s  to be large. 
In Scenario 3, with less information than in Scenario 2, the range of probabilities is 
wider and the values of  0 s  are smaller, indicating a smaller ‘pseudo sample size’ for the 
prior. In general, the range for   will be larger since there is more uncertainty in the 
estimates when there is less information. 
0 t
Table 1 lists the priors that we chose, using the above guidelines, for our reliability 
assessment example. The robust Bayesian priors are selected to be generally consistent 
with the precise priors in that the Bayesian priors contain the precise priors as specific 
cases. 
Table 1 Bayesian  priors  for 0.04 θ =  case 
Approach No  prior 
info. 
Partial prior 
info. 
(good) 
Partial prior 
info. 
(bad) 
Substantial 
prior info. 
(good) 
Substantial 
prior info. 
(bad) 
Precise 
Bayesian 
1
1
α
β
=
=
 
1.1
25
α
β
=
=
 
1.8
22
α
β
=
=
 
4
96
α
β
=
=
 
6
94
α
β
=
=
 
Robust 
Bayesian 
0
0
0
0
0 
1
0 
2
t
t
s
s
=
=
=
=
 
0
0
0
0
0.00
0.05
20
30
t
t
s
s
=
=
=
=
 
0
0
0
0
0.05 
0.10
20
30
t
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4  Analysis of no information scenario 
In this section we will compare the statistical approaches under Scenario 1, the no 
information scenario. Their performance in Scenarios 2 and 3 is considered in Section 5. 
To illustrate the differences, consider the example presented earlier and the following 
choices for the statistical approaches: the classical approach uses the 95% confidence 
interval of equation (1), the Bayesian prior is the uniform  00 (1 ,1 ) , αβ = = and the 
imprecise beta prior is the vacuous prior  0 0 (0 ,1 tt ) = =  with a learning parameter of 
0 0 s =  and  0 2. s =  
Table 2 describes the conclusions for some of the possible outcomes of running 
 trials. Note that for   the rule of thumb for equation (1) is not met. 
As the number of observed failures increases, the confidence interval on 
100 n = 5, 100 mn <=
θ  widens and 
the posterior beta distributions shift, which increases the 95% credible intervals for both 
the precise Bayesian approach and the imprecise beta model. 
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Table 2  Conclusions based on 100 trials 
# of 
failures 
Classical approach  Precise Bayesian Imprecise  beta 
m 95%  confidence 
interval 
95% credible 
interval 
Range of 95% credible 
intervals 
0  [0, 0.000]  [0, 0.029]  [0, 0] to [0, 0.046] 
1  [0, 0.026]  [0, 0.046]  [0, 0.029] to [0, 0.061] 
2  [0, 0.043]  [0, 0.061]  [0, 0.046] to [0, 0.075] 
3  [0, 0.058]  [0, 0.075]  [0, 0.061] to [0, 0.088] 
4  [0, 0.072]  [0, 0.088]  [0, 0.075] to [0, 0.101] 
5  [0, 0.086]  [0, 0.101]  [0, 0.088] to [0, 0.114] 
6  [0, 0.099]  [0, 0.114]  [0, 0.101] to [0, 0.126] 
7  [0, 0.112]  [0, 0.126]  [0, 0.114] to [0, 0.138] 
8  [0, 0.125]  [0, 0.138]  [0, 0.126] to [0, 0.150] 
9  [0, 0.137]  [0, 0.150]  [0, 0.138] to [0, 0.162] 
10  [0, 0.149]  [0, 0.162]  [0, 0.150] to [0, 0.174] 
The imprecise beta approach covers all possible low-evidence beta priors with means that 
range from 0 to 1. Each prior leads to a single posterior and consequently the imprecise 
beta approach gives a range, or interval, of point estimates in addition to credible 
intervals. Note that the larger imprecise beta credible intervals contain the precise 
Bayesian credible intervals, as they should because the set of priors includes the uniform 
prior used in the precise Bayesian approach. 
A comparison between the Bayesian credible intervals and the classical confidence 
intervals is not exact because the meaning of the two types of intervals is different. 
However, it is common in both approaches to use a 95%-level for decision making since 
these intervals form reasonable bounds on a point estimate of the reliability. 
Consequently, an informal comparison is informative. As shown in Table 2, the classical 
confidence intervals are just slightly smaller than the smallest credible intervals for the 
imprecise beta approach and are considerably smaller than the credible intervals for the 
precise Bayesian approach. In general, one expects more information to yield smaller 
intervals. 
As we will see also in other results later in this paper, the quality of the information 
matters as well. The smallest imprecise beta credible intervals much more closely match 
the classical confidence intervals because the set of priors contains those with near-zero 
values of α and β (which corresponds to a near-zero learning parameter). These near-zero 
priors have little influence on the posterior distribution and are therefore arguably less 
informative than the uniform prior distribution, in which  00 1 αβ = =  (Zhu and Lu, 
2004). When the prior’s parameter values are near zero, the mean of the posterior is very 
close to   and the credible interval is close to the classical confidence interval. Other 
priors have larger parameter values (up to 
/ mn
00 2, αβ + =  in which case the learning 
parameter equals 2). Some of these have means close to   but many others have 
means that are far away from   The combination of the larger learning parameter 
and large mean leads to posteriors whose means are not as close to   and credible 
intervals that are not as close to the classical confidence interval. The precise Bayesian 
/, mn
/ m
/ . mn
n
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credible interval is not as close to the classical confidence interval for the same reason: it 
has  00 2 αβ +=
/. n
 and its mean equals 0.5. The posterior mean is nearly 0.01 greater than 
  m
Alternatively, consider how the conclusions would change based on the number of 
trials, for a fixed relative frequency of observed failures to trials. For instance, if   
m/n = 0.04, then the conclusions change based on the number of trials as shown in   
Table 3. The confidence intervals decrease in width as the number of trials increases 
because the large number of trials reduces the sample variance. Similarly, the credible 
intervals decrease in width because the variance of the posterior distribution decreases. 
This also increases the probability that  . crit θ θ ≤  The probability from the precise 
Bayesian approach is in the middle of the range of upper and lower probabilities that 
result from the imprecise beta model. Note also that this range significantly decreases as 
the number of trials increases. 
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate how the results of the imprecise beta approach reflect the 
amount of information available, while the precise Bayesian approach conceals it. If we 
compare the results for 6 failures out of 100 trials from Table 2 and the results for 2 
failures out of 50 trials from Table 3, we see that the credible intervals for the precise 
Bayesian approach are nearly the same, despite the difference in observed failure rate 
(6% versus 4%) and the different amounts of data. However, the ranges of credible 
intervals for the imprecise beta approach are quite different and reflect the underlying 
amount of information. In the first case (where there is more information), the difference 
of the upper bounds is 0.025. In the second case (where there is less information), the 
difference of the upper bounds is 0.055. 
Table 3  Conclusions with observed failures at 4% 
Number of trials  Classical approach  Precise Bayesian  Imprecise beta 
n   95% confidence  
interval 
95% credible 
interval 
Range of 95% credible 
intervals 
25    [0, 0.104]  [0, 0.170]  [0, 0.109] to [0, 0.223] 
50    [0, 0.086]  [0, 0.118]  [0, 0.090] to [0, 0.145] 
100    [0, 0.072]  [0, 0.088]  [0, 0.075] to [0, 0.101] 
200    [0, 0.063]  [0, 0.071]  [0, 0.064] to [0, 0.077] 
500    [0, 0.054]  [0, 0.057]  [0, 0.055] to [0, 0.060] 
1000    [0, 0.050]  [0, 0.052]  [0, 0.051] to [0, 0.053] 
2000    [0, 0.047]  [0, 0.048]  [0, 0.047] to [0, 0.048] 
5 Estimate  comparison 
In this section we will consider how the available information affects the results of the 
precise Bayesian approach and imprecise beta model. We will consider both the quality 
of the prior distribution (is it close to θ or not) and the magnitude of the prior (does it 
represent no information, partial information, or substantial information). We will 
consider the case in which the number of observed failures equals the expected number. 
To perform this comparison, we will use the priors listed in Table 1. 
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5.1  Point estimates for θ 
All three methods can be used to create point estimates for  . θ  While these point 
estimates may be complemented by confidence or credible intervals (as discussed in 
Section 4 for the case of no prior information), it is informative to consider how the point 
estimates change under the different information scenarios. We assume that the number 
of observed failures equals the expected number; that is  , mn θ =  with  0.04, θ =  for all n. 
In practice, the observed frequency will differ from the true long range frequency. The 
average performance in the context of decision making is addressed in other articles 
(Aughenbaugh and Herrmann, 2008, 2009). 
In the classical approach, the point estimate is independent of the initial information 
scenario and is given by   which is constant by assumption. For the other two 
approaches, the results change as the new information updates the prior assumptions. The 
results for the precise Bayesian approach are shown in Figure 2 for each of the prior 
scenarios defined in Table 1. Notice that the ‘bad partial prior’ information scenario 
converges more quickly to the true probability than the non-informative prior does, but 
that the bad substantial prior scenario converges more slowly. This reveals an interesting 
trade-off between the quantity and quality of information. A little information that is in 
the neighbourhood of the truth is valuable, but a lot of such close-but-inaccurate 
information can be detrimental. 
ˆ / mn θ =
Figure 2  For the precise beta model, the evolution of point estimates for θ (see online version 
for colours) 
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The imprecise beta model can be used to determine upper and lower bounds on point 
estimates of  , θ  as shown in Figure 3 for each of the prior scenarios defined in Table 1. 
To improve the readability of the chart, the lower bounds are shown with lines, the upper 
bounds are shown using the error bars and the abscissa for each point for an informative 
prior is shifted to the right or left of the point for the non-informative prior. In all cases, 
the lower and upper bounds converge as the number of trials increases. Additionally, it 
should be noted that initially the bad substantial prior result is a subset of the bad partial 
prior result, which in turn is a subset of the vacuous prior result. As   increases, the  n
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vacuous prior and partial prior results adapt faster to the observed data and converge 
more quickly to the truth than the substantial prior case does. 
Figure 3  For the imprecise beta model, the range of point estimates for θ (see online version for 
colours) 
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Note: The lower bounds are shown with the solid lines and the upper bounds are shown 
with the error bars. The abscissa of each series is shifted slightly to improve 
display. 
5.2  Probability of an acceptable design 
The probability that  crit θ θ ≤  is a key output of both the precise Bayesian approach and 
the imprecise beta model approach, but this estimate is not applicable in the classical 
approach. As in the previous section, we assume that the number of observed failures 
equals the expected number; that is,  , mn θ =  with  0.04. θ =  
Figure 4 shows the change in this probability using the precise Bayesian approach for 
the five priors listed in Table 1. The plot reveals that, as expected, more good information 
leads to a better assessment. However, it also reveals that having a small amount of bad 
prior information is useful (compared to the non-informative prior), but a lot of bad 
information can be detrimental, as was the case with the point estimates. A ‘bad’ estimate 
that is near the truth but has little weight essentially provides a good starting point for fast 
updates based on the observed data, especially compared to the uniform prior, which 
essentially estimates that θ  is just as likely to be near 0.96 (or any other value) as near 
the true value of 0.04. A bad estimate that is given a lot of weight will not allow the 
posterior to adapt quickly enough to the observed data, as illustrated by the   
non-informative curve crossing the bad substantial prior curve around 90 trials. 
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Figure 4  For the precise Bayesian approach, the posterior probability of that θ is acceptable  
(see online version for colours) 
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The results for the imprecise beta model are shown in Figure 5 for the five priors listed in 
Table 1. As before, the lower bounds are shown with the solid lines, the upper bounds are 
shown with the error bars and the abscissa of each series is shifted slightly to improve 
display. In this figure, it is clear not only how the probability converges to one (as it did 
in the precise case, too), but also how the available information narrows in on the 
appropriate value. 
Figure 5  For the imprecise beta approach, the posterior probability that θ is acceptable  
(see online version for colours) 
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Note: As before, the ranges are shown from lower (solid) to upper (error bars), abscissa 
offset slightly. 
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For example, with 25 trials starting with no prior information, the precise approach 
suggests that  crit [ ] 0.38. P θ θ ≤= Thus, based on this evidence, it is more likely that 
crit, θ θ >  meaning the new design is inferior to the old. In comparison, the imprecise beta 
approach yields the interval estimate  crit 0.14 [ ] 0.74. P θ θ ≤ ≤≤ This suggests that, given 
the available information, the likelihood that the new product is an improvement ranges 
from highly unlikely to fairly likely. This imprecision explicitly reflects the underlying 
scarcity of information. 
6  Discussion of approaches 
This section will summarise the above results and make additional observations in order 
to compare the statistical approaches. 
6.1  Adopting a Bayesian viewpoint 
The debate between Bayesians and non-Bayesians has been long, contentious and without 
universal resolution (Rothenberg, 1974; Zellner, 1974; Clarotti, 1993). However, there 
are certain properties of Bayesian analysis that are often attractive in practice. 
First, Bayesian analyses obey the ‘likelihood principle’, which basically states that all 
relevant information from an experiment is contained in the likelihood function and that 
two likelihoods contain the same information if they are proportional to each other [for 
example, see (Berger, 1985)]. This implies that inferences should be made based on the 
data that was actually observed, not on hypothetical data that may have been observed 
but was not. 
Lindley and Phillips (1976) give the following example of the likelihood principle as 
it applies to Bayesian and sampling theory approaches, showing that sampling theory 
approaches depend on the stopping rule used in the experiment. Consider experiment A 
in which   trials are performed and the number of failures   are counted. In experiment 
B, trials are performed until   failures are observed, which happens to take   trials in 
this example. Even though the same result of   failures out of   trials was observed in 
each experiment, a sampling theory approach can lead to different conclusions in a 
hypothesis test. This occurs because experiment A involves a binomial distribution and 
experiment B involves a negative binomial distribution. However, the likelihood 
functions differ only by a scalar constant and consequently the Bayesian inference will be 
the same in experiments A and B, just as the actually observed data is the same in both 
experiments. 
n m
m n
m n
Second, a Bayesian analysis can take advantage of existing information. Thus, in 
some cases the Bayesian approach can incorporate more information than a classical 
approach. Of course, the impact of prior beliefs decreases as more data is obtained. Third, 
Bayesian approaches enable analysts to make direct probability statements about 
hypotheses and model parameters, statements that cannot be made in classical 
approaches. 
The classical and Bayesian approaches are compatible under certain scenarios. For 
example, if the Bayesian prior is a constant non-informative one and the analyst uses the 
mode of the posterior distribution as the point estimate, then this is exactly the same as 
the maximum likelihood estimate in the classical approach (Hogg and Tanis, 2001). 
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The precise Bayesian approach can involve more computational effort than the 
classical approach, especially when the use of conjugate priors cannot be justified. It also 
requires the prior information to be elicited and formulated correctly, which is not always 
a straightforward or inexpensive task. A robust Bayesian approach reduces the necessity 
of complete elicitation while still incorporating information that is easily obtained or 
available. 
The classical approach requires less computational effort but does not take into 
account any information that might be available before testing. This feature has the 
additional advantage of being insensitive to the quality of the information. If one ignores 
the information, it doesn’t matter if it is wrong. 
6.2  Selecting a prior distribution 
The Bayesian approaches can use prior information to help the designer make an accurate 
estimate with less additional information. However, they are greatly affected by the 
quality and amount of existing information. In general, it appears that using a prior based 
on partial information is less ‘risky’ than using a prior that represents substantial 
information. Using a prior based on substantial information can lead to poor results if it is 
a ‘bad’ prior because overcoming the incorrect information will take a great amount of 
new information. Of course, if the prior is ‘good’, then good decisions can be made 
quickly. Therefore, using partial information may be a good compromise. A prior (or set 
of priors) based on such partial information provides an effective head start compared to 
the non-informative prior (or vacuous priors) with minimal investment in information 
gathering, but, if the prior information is incorrect, new information can overcome the 
prior more easily than it would if the prior was based on substantial information. Even 
when substantial information is available, a prior can be constructed that discounts this 
information, for example by choosing smaller parameters of the beta distribution. 
Selecting the form of the prior distribution is also an important part of the Bayesian 
approach. The precise Bayesian can be more difficult to calculate when conjugate priors 
are not available. Although a particular conjugate prior may be useful for computational 
convenience, it may not represent the prior information perfectly. When there is little 
prior information available, additional challenges occur. Using a single precise prior in 
this case seems to conceal the lack of information, as shown by the comparison to the 
robust Bayesian approach. 
6.3  Specifying a set of prior distributions 
There are at least two arguments as to why a designer should not consider a single prior 
distribution – one practical and one philosophical. First, because eliciting and assessing 
an individual’s beliefs is a resource intensive process, it will often be impractical to fully 
characterise them (Savage, 1971; Weber, 1987; Walley, 1991; Groen and Mosleh, 2005). 
Consequently, only a partial (i.e., imprecise) characterisation will be available. This is the 
view that advocates of the robust Bayesian or Bayesian sensitivity analysis approaches 
hold. 
The second argument asserts that true beliefs need not be precise. A person may be 
unwilling to commit to either side of a gamble when he has no information about it. It is 
possible that one would be satisfied with some price, but this is not a condition for 
      
 
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
           
     
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
    
       A comparison of statistical approaches for assessing reliability  283      
 
rationality. This view is the one that advocates of imprecise probabilities generally hold 
(Pericchi and Walley, 1991; Walley, 1991). 
The use of upper and lower probabilities has a number of advantages in this situation 
(Walley, 1996; Walley et al., 1996). Most relevant to the decision being discussed here, 
the results reflect the amount of information on which the conclusions are drawn; one can 
distinguish between probabilities based on a large amount of data and those based on 
ignorance. Moreover, the approach is able to model prior ignorance in a very intuitive 
way and it includes common Bayesian models for prior ignorance as special cases. 
For example, in the partial information scenario, the precise Bayesian approach 
chooses one prior for the new component’s failure probability, an approach that is 
consistent with the premise that an individual’s beliefs can always be modelled by 
exactly one prior distribution. If the designer is unsure about the failure probability, a 
precise Bayesian analyst may address this lack of confidence in the estimate by 
increasing the variance of the prior model, thus reflecting more uncertainty of some kind. 
Taken to the extreme, a complete lack of information generally leads to a uniform 
distribution. Unfortunately, the use of a uniform distribution confounds two cases: first, 
that nothing is known; second, that all failure probabilities between 0 and 1 are equally 
likely, which is actually substantial information. 
In the context of a large engineering project in which there are many individuals, this 
is an important distinction. For example, one engineer’s complete lack of knowledge 
about some aspect of the system may be offset by another engineer’s expertise or by 
additional experimentation. However, if substantial analysis has already led to the 
conclusion that certain outcomes are equally likely, then it would be inefficient to expend 
additional resources examining those probabilities. In a precise Bayesian approach, both 
scenarios would be represented by a uniform prior distribution, even though the 
underlying scenarios are inherently different. The robust Bayesian approach allows one to 
consider the different scenarios independently rather than aggregating them together. 
This affords the design team the opportunity to make different, more appropriate 
decisions about information management under the two scenarios. 
Using the robust Bayesian approach or imprecise probabilities can require more effort 
than the precise Bayesian approach, especially when conjugate models such as the 
imprecise beta (or imprecise Dirichlet) models do not apply. Also, as multiple sources of 
uncertainty are propagated, it may be that the resulting intervals are quite large, leading to 
considerable regions of imprecision, as our results showed. 
The imprecise beta model allows the designer to use ranges to express his beliefs 
about the value of the parameter (via a range of means) and the importance of the prior 
data (via a range of learning parameters). Such caution about the prior information 
reduces the precision of the estimate, but it also improves its accuracy. Essentially, the 
analyst can say less about the parameters, but what the analyst does say is more likely to 
be true. Thus, this model reflects both the quality and quantity of information available, 
including indirectly revealing any conflict between the prior information and the new 
data. 
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7 Summary 
A variety of statistical approaches are available for updating assessments of the reliability 
of a component based on test results. This paper has compared the classical sampling 
theory approach, the precise Bayesian approach and an imprecise beta model, which is 
compatible with both a robust Bayesian approach and a particular imprecise probabilities 
approach for this problem. We have focused on exploring how each method behaves as 
more information is collected and using those results to illustrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach. Direct quantitative comparisons and general judgements of 
absolute superiority are not possible due to the inherently different assumptions and 
structures underlying each method. These conclusions have been illustrated using a 
specific example decision. A designer can use the presented methods to gain insight into 
the tradeoffs that exist in a specific domain. 
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